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TOO FAR OVER THE HEDGE: WHY THE
SEC'S ATTEMPT TO FURTHER REGULATE
HEDGE FUNDS HAD TO FAIL & WHAT, IF
ANY, ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED
SIMEON G. MANNt

INTRODUCTION

As individuals attempt to preserve and grow their wealth in
a quite volatile economic environment, more have turned toward
hedge funds as one of the components necessary to achieving
their financial goals.1 Further, over the last decade the amount
of assets invested in hedge funds has outpaced other supposedly2
more conservative investment classes, such as mutual funds.
t J.D. Candidate, 2008, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2002, Queens
College, City University of New York.
1 See CHARLES J. GRADANTE, COMMENTS OF HENNESSEE GROUP LLC FOR THE
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ROUNDTABLE ON HEDGE FUNDS 4-5
(2003), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-gradante.pdf (informing that
according to Hennessee's research data, assets invested in hedge funds grew from
$20 billion in 1987 to $35 billion in 1992 to $50 billion in 1993, and from there,
according to most reputable sources, reached almost $600 billion as of January
2003); see also IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO
THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 n.2 (2003),
[hereinafter THE REPORT]
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf
(relating that at the SEC Roundtable on Hedge Funds, which helped the SEC write
The Report, the consensus was that there is approximately $600 billion currently
invested in hedge funds as of 2003, but also pointing out that other estimates "vary
greatly"). In keeping with this trend, from 2003 through the end of June 2006, assets
invested in hedge funds doubled, growing from $600 billion to approximately $1.22
trillion. See Q2 Sees Biggest Jump in New Hedge Fund Inflows Since 2003,
HEDGEWEEK.COM, June 28, 2007, http://www.hedgeweek.com/articles/pdf-page.jsp?
content id=29604 (registration required) (reporting on newly-released data compiled
and analyzed by Hedge Fund Research, Inc.); see also Marcia L. MacHarg, Waking
Up to Hedge Funds: Is U.S. Regulation Really Taking a New Direction?, in HEDGE
FUNDS: RISKS AND REGULATIONS 55, 55 (Theodor Baums & Andreas Cahn eds.,
2004) (describing the recent growth of the hedge fund sector as "stunning").
2 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2 & n.4 (pointing out that while the
amount of assets invested in hedge funds grew by 1,084% from 1993 to 2003, other
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Surprisingly, even with this growing popularity there is no
3
unanimously agreed-upon definition of what is a "hedge fund."
Problematically, this lack of a definition extends to U.S. federal
securities law as well. 4 One common description of a hedge fund
is that it is a "[sometimes] aggressively managed portfolio of
investments that uses advanced investment strategies such as
[but not limited to] leverage, long, short and derivative positions
in both domestic and international markets with the goal of
generating high returns."5
6
This explosion in hedge fund assets piqued the interest of
the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 7 The SEC's
desire to learn more about hedge funds prompted its staff to
embark on a study of the sector and to hold a roundtable
discussion on the state of hedge funds.8 The outgrowth of these
endeavors was the belief of the SEC that it did not have adequate
regulatory measures in place to properly monitor hedge funds in
order to protect investors. 9 This then led the SEC to propose
amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers
asset groups did not experience the same success). For reference, The Report
explains that from 1992 to 2002, mutual fund assets grew by 289%, insurance
company assets grew by 110%, and commercial bank assets grew by 100%. Id.
3 Id. at 3. To demonstrate this lack of a definition, one panelist at the
Roundtable gathered and submitted fourteen such definitions. See DAVID A.
VAUGHAN, COMMENTS FOR THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ROUNDTABLE ON HEDGE FUNDS (2003), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/
hedge-vaughn.htm.
4 See, e.g., Franklin R. Edwards, The Regulation of Hedge Funds: Financial
Stability and Investor Protection, in HEDGE FUNDS: RISKS AND REGULATIONS, supra
note 1, at 30, 32.
5 Hedge Fund, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.comlterms/hlhedge
fund.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). The commentary in the definition states that
"hedging is actually the practice of attempting to reduce risk, but... [t]he name is
mostly historical .... Nowadays, hedge funds use dozens of different strategies, so it
isn't accurate to say that hedge funds just 'hedge risk.' " Id.
6 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
7 The SEC is the federal agency responsible for protecting investors, monitoring
the securities markets, and enforcing federal regulations pertaining to them. See
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.
gov/aboutlwhatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
8 See generally THE REPORT, supra note 1 (referring throughout to the data
presented by panelists at the Roundtable).
9 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 45,172 & 45,185 (proposed July 28, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Rule] ("Our
current regulatory program for hedge funds and hedge fund advisers is
inadequate .... We have no oversight program that would provide us with the
ability to deter or detect fraud .... ).
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Act"), 10 which it felt would allow for sufficient monitoring of the
In hand with the proposal, the SEC requested
sector.11
comments on the proposed amendments from the industry itself
12
and from individual investors.
13 Of
The request for input was met with much commentary.
the letters received, 14 fifty-two percent were in opposition to the
amendments, with only twenty-two percent of the letters actually
supporting the implementation of the amendments. 15 Even with
the majority of the letters recommending the amendments be
abandoned, the SEC plowed ahead, promulgating the Final
Rule. 16 The intended outcome was to require that most hedge
fund mangers, i.e., the fund's investment adviser(s), be registered
with the SEC by February 1, 2006.17 Perhaps most jarring was
that the amendments were finalized not only over the dissent of
the industry, but also over the dissent of two of the five SEC
18
commissioners.
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000).

11 See generally Proposed Rule, supra note 9 (outlining each of the amendments
and the reasons for each of them). The most important amendment proposed was
changing the definition of "clients" in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) to include any limited
partners or passive investors in hedge funds. This would force the investment
advisers of many hedge funds to register, as they would now fail to meet the
exception to registration, which allows one to avoid registration only if he has fewer
than fifteen "clients." See id. at 45,182. For a complete discussion of the statutes, the
amendments, and what they were designed to do, see infra Part I.
12 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,185 to 45,187 (asking for comments
from readers after each of the proposed amendments is explained).
13 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,333, 84 SEC Docket 1032, pt. I.C (Dec. 2,
2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia2333.htm [hereinafter Final Rule] (explaining the response the SEC received from
its request for comments).
14 For complete access to all comments submitted, including those in favor of the
amendments, those opposed to the amendments, and those that did not express an
opinion as to that particular question, see Comments on Proposed Rule: Registration
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2,266, File No. S7-30-04, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.
shtml.
15 See Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. I.C. The SEC received 161 letters of
comment from a variety of sources including hedge fund advisers, individual
investors, law firms, and other investment advisers. Of the 161 letters received,
forty-two of them did not support or disagree with the rule, thirty-six supported the
rule, and eighty-three of the letters were in opposition to the rule. Id.
16 See id. pt. II.
17 Id. pt. III.
18 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,197 (Cynthia A. Glassman & Paul S.
Atkins, Commissioners, dissenting); see also Final Rule, supra note 13 (Cynthia A.
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Although the amendments to the Advisers Act meant many
hedge fund advisers now had to register with the SEC, 19 the
consequences of which were sure to be burdensome, 20 almost all
of the advisers and their funds were unwilling to formally
challenge the authority of the SEC to propose and adopt
said amendments. 21 One manager, Phillip Goldstein, 22 was
nevertheless determined to confront the SEC as to the legitimacy
of the actions it had taken. 23 Mr. Goldstein filed suit against the
SEC on December 9, 2005.24 More surprising than the filing of
the suit itself was that Mr. Goldstein and his investment firm
came out victorious 2 5: The Court of Appeals ruled unanimously
that the amendment pertaining to the definition of the term
"client" for the sake of only one section of the Advisers Act was an

Glassman & Paul S. Atkins, Commissioners, dissenting) (reiterating their opposal to
the proposed amendments).
19 See Court Challenge Looms Over SEC Hedge Fund Proposal, GLOBAL RISK
REGULATOR, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.globalriskregulator.com/archive/
October2004-05.html (explaining that if the amendments to the Advisers Act are
adopted, "the SEC estimates that between 690 and 1,260 advisers will be required to
register"). In the end, the SEC's estimates were low, and more than 2,000 funds fell
under the registration requirements that went into effect. See Liz Moyer, Whither
Hedge Funds?, FORBES.COM, Aug. 4, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/
08/04/sec-hedge-funds-appeal-cxjlm-0804hedge.html.
20 See, e.g., Nir Yarden, Hedge Fund Manager Registration, FORBES.COM, Dec.
28, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/2005/12/27/hedge-funds-commentary-cx-ny_1228
hedge.print.html (delving into the "significant" costs that registration would present
to hedge fund advisers and the funds themselves).
21 Telephone Interview with Phillip Goldstein, Principal, Bulldog Investors;
President, Opportunity Partners L.P.; and General Partner, Kimball & Winthrop,
Inc., in Queens, N.Y. (Aug. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Goldstein Interview] (telling the
author that he (Goldstein) tried to convince other hedge fund managers to join in his
lawsuit against the SEC, but they all declined, perhaps out of fear of repercussions).
22 A veteran manager in the hedge fund industry, Mr. Goldstein is a co-founder
of Bulldog Investors, a group of hedge funds that use value-driven strategies to
achieve absolute positive returns for its investors. He is also an outspoken advocate
of hedge funds and is often sought for his opinions on issues of corporate governance.
For a more complete biography of Mr. Goldstein and the funds' strategies, see the
Bulldog Investors website at http://www.bulldoginvestors.com (presently under
construction).
23 See Goldstein Interview, supra note 21 (explaining to the author that he felt
someone had to stand up to the SEC, and how that someone was going to have to be
him).
24 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
25 See id. at 879-84 (going over the rationale behind ruling in favor of Mr.
Goldstein).
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"arbitrary rule" and must therefore be vacated. 26 The decision
27
essentially meant that the rule no longer existed.
The court's definitive statement spurred a flurry of activity.
Within days of the ruling, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
held a hearing to analyze whether the best strategy would be to
focus more on enforcing current laws applicable to hedge funds, 28
or if there really was a need for new legislation. 29 This was
followed less than a month later by Chairman Cox of the SEC
testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs that he had directed the staff of the
SEC to take a number of "emergency action[s]" 30 in light of the
Goldstein decision.
Even with this testimony, the SEC
ultimately decided against appealing the case en banc to the
Supreme Court. 3 1 As these events unfolded, divergent voices
trumpeted the necessity of the court's decision, claiming that no
further regulation was needed and that the Final Rule would
32
have caused more harm than good.
26 Id. at 884.
27 See The Goldstein Decision: So Now What?, IM INSIGHT NEWS, June 23, 2006
(received via email from Phillip Goldstein; on file with author) [hereinafter Goldstein
Decision: So Now What?] (quoting a legal expert as stating that when a rule is
vacated, that means the rule is "[t]oast").
2s See, e.g., THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 ("Investment advisers that are
exempt from registration nevertheless are subject to the antifraud provisions of the
[Investment] Advisers Act [of 1940].").
29 See Liz Moyer, Senate Weighs Hedge Fund Regulations, FORBES.COM, June
28, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/06/28/hedge-fund-hearings-cx-lm_06
28hedge.html [hereinafter Moyer, Senate Weighs Regulations].
30 See Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: HearingBefore the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC), avaiable at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
2006/ts072506cc.htm [hereinafter Cox Testimony]. Interestingly, many of the
"emergency action[s]" that Chairman Cox mentioned had to do with undoing the
effects that the Goldstein decision had on the Advisers Act, like to whom the adviser
owes a fiduciary duty. Id.
31 See S.E.C. Decides It Won't Appeal on Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006,
at C9. The decision not to appeal was a statement in and of itself, as many thought
that the SEC would surely appeal their case to the United States Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Court of Appeals Strikes Down SEC Hedge Funds Registration Rule,
HEDGEWEEK.COM, June 26, 2006, http://www.hedgeweek.com/articles/detail.jsp?con
tentid=2701 (registration required) (writing, in a commentary on the Goldstein
decision, how "the SEC will likely seek permission to appeal to the Supreme Court"
(emphasis added)).
32 See, e.g., Perrie Weiner, Puttingthe "Hedge"Back, FORBES.COM, July 3, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/06/30/hedge-funds-sec-comment-cx-pw_0703
weiner.html ("The SEC's hedge fund registration requirement was ill-conceived, did
not serve to protect investors, and met a well-deserved fate .... ).
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Consequently, as the hedge fund industry continues to grow
and assert its position in the portfolios of investors and world
capital markets, 33 the laws and registration requirements
This regulatory
pertaining to it are anything but settled.
uncertainty provides the backdrop to the issues that this Note
attempts to address. This Note puts forth that the court's
decision in Goldstein, which stifled the SEC's attempt to further
regulate hedge funds, is a positive legal development for the
hedge fund industry, the investing public, and the SEC itself.
This Note, in fact, proposes that it was not just positive, but
imperative, for the SEC to fail in its chosen course of action. This
Note also stresses that while the hedge fund sector may require
some form of change, the amendments the SEC proposed would
not have alleviated the concerns they were meant to extinguish;
therefore, any additional steps taken should be of a different
variety than the amendments that ultimately failed when
analyzed by the court.
Part I of this Note will give a more complete picture
as to why hedge funds have historically been exempt from
registration and the events that coalesced to bring forth the
current confusion. Part II will present a deeper understanding
as to why the SEC's failure to further regulate the hedge fund
industry is a positive turn of events for all parties and how any
other outcome would have only created more problems. Finally,
Part III of this Note will present some possible alternative
solutions to consider in contrast to SEC's failed solution, which
can alleviate the fears of the SEC while still recognizing the
needs of the industry and its investors as well.
I.

THE STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS & HOW THE UNCERTAINTY
DEVELOPED

Hedge funds have been utilized as an investment tool for
over sixty years. 34 Over the last fifteen years, money has flowed
into the sector in impressive amounts, leading the current level
of assets invested in hedge funds to exceed $1.2 trillion.3 5 This
33 See Cox Testimony, supra note 30 ("Although hedge funds represent just 5%
of all U.S. assets under management, they account for about 30% of all U.S. equity
trading volume.").
34 See Edwards, supra note 4, at 30.
35 See Philipp M. Hildebrand, Member, Governing Board, Swiss Nat'l Bank,
Opening Address at the 59th Annual Conference of the CFA Institute: The Virtues of
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success is due in large part to the fact that most funds and their
advisers are exempt from registration and all of the demands and
restrictions it encompasses. This Part will explain how hedge
funds take advantage of these exemptions, how turmoil has
recently unfolded due to the SEC's newfound discomfort with
these exemptions, and how the agency's actions have only caused
more confusion.
A.

The Exemptions Utilized by Hedge Funds

There are four statutes that act as the cornerstones of the
SEC's regulation and monitoring of the securities markets.
These are the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Company Act"),
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Securities Act of 1933
("1933 Act"), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Act"). 36 Most mainstream investment companies, such as mutual
funds, must register under these Acts. 37 Registration, in turn,
38
restricts what strategies may be used to obtain positive returns.
For perspective, consider that popular hedge fund strategies such
as using leverage, employing short-selling tactics, investing in
derivatives instruments, and concentrating a fund's assets
completely in one or few investments are all highly regulated or
disallowed completely by the SEC for investment companies
39
required to register.
Within these Acts, there are key exemptions that the hedge
fund industry utilizes in order to avoid registration, enabling
them to pursue more freely their goal of absolute returns. The
rationale most often offered to explain why certain investment
structures, such as hedge funds, should be exempt from
registration is that investments in hedge funds are made by
"sophisticated" investors. 40 Sophisticated investors are those
individuals or entities that have a certain level of assets, are
Flexible Financial Markets: A Central Banking Perspective (May 22, 2006),
http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref 20060522_pmh/source/ref_20060522_pmh
.en.pdf.
36 See Edwards, supra note 4, at 33.
37 See Investment Company Institute, The Differences Between Mutual Funds
and Hedge Funds, http://www.ici.org/funds/abt/faqs-hedge.html (last visited Sept.
17, 2007).
38 See id. ('Virtually every aspect of a mutual fund's structure and operation is
subject to strict regulation ....
").
39 See MacHarg, supra note 1, at 61-65.
40 See id. at 61.
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familiar with the risks of the funds through investing experience,
and usually have a previous relationship with the managers of
the fund. 41 These investors are viewed as being able to perform
their own due diligence in order to decide for themselves if the
potential financial rewards are worth the risk. 42 As each statute
and its exemptions are discussed, it is imperative to remember
that while the exemptions allow funds to not register, the
exemptions never free hedge funds from the multiple anti-fraud
provisions written into the Acts, and funds and their managers
43
are always responsible for operating their companies honestly.
The Investment Company Act of 1940
The first relevant statute is the Company Act. 44 It defines
any company that is engaged in investing in other companies'
securities as an "investment company," and requires it to register
with the SEC. 4 5 Registration entails the initial disclosure of
much information regarding many aspects of the company, and
then further disclosures of information on a regular basis, such
as the company's structure, investment strategies, and
It also allows the SEC to perform on-site
operations. 46
examinations.4 7 Although hedge funds definitely invest in other
companies' securities, they usually rely on two of the exemptions
written into the Company Act in order to avoid having to register
48
as an "investment company."
First, under section 3(c)(1), if a company (or fund) has no
more than 100 investors and does not attempt to offer investment
1.

41 Id.

42 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 4, at 35 (relating that the reason to treat the
investors of hedge funds differently is "premised on the philosophy that wealthy (or
'qualified) investors should be free to make their own decisions unhindered by
government regulation... and in return should have to bear the full consequences
of their investment decisions-good or bad").
43 See, e.g., MacHarg, supra note 1, at 61-71 (noting the numerous anti-fraud
provisions that hedge funds already must comply with that are found in these Acts,
the Commodity Exchange Act, the Patriot Act, and various state statutes).
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (2000).
45

Id.

46 Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association Primer on SecuritiesInvestment Company Act of 1940, http://www.sifma.org/legislative/invstmt-comp_
act-of 1940.html [hereinafter Primer] (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
47 Phillip R. Mack, Recent Trends in the Mutual Fund Industry, FED. RES.
BULL., Nov. 1993, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m4l26/is_nll_
v79/ai_14714669.
48 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-12.

2008]

TOO FAR OVER THE HEDGE

opportunities in the fund to the general public, registration with
the SEC is not required. 49 The second exemption used by hedge
funds is section 3(c)(7), 50 which allows companies that have
"qualified purchasers" 51 as their only investors, the choice to not
register. 52
Meeting these exemptions, together with the
exemptions of the other Acts, allows hedge funds to avoid
registration.
2.

The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The Advisers Act was passed in tandem with the Company
53
Act and was meant to be enforced alongside it.
As the Company
Act requires registration of investment companies and demands
strict disclosure guidelines of them, the Advisers Act serves the
same purpose for the registration of investment advisers. 54 The
Advisers Act defines an investment adviser as "any person who,
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others,
either directly or through publicationsor writings, as to the value
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing,
or selling securities." 55 Although hedge fund managers meet the
definition of "investment adviser,"56 as with the Company Act,
most hedge funds and their managers design their funds to fall
within an exemption expressed in section 203(b)(3) of the
Advisers Act. This exemption does not require registration if the
49 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000). Subsection (c) deals with "further exemptions"
from what will be considered an investment company and lists as the first such
exemption: "Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper)
are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not
making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities."
Id.
50 Id. § 80a-3(c)(7) (exempting "[any issuer, the outstanding securities of which
are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities,
are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose
to make a public offering of such securities"); see also THE REPORT, supra note 1, at
12.
51 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 n.37 (citing section 2(a)(51) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 defining a "qualified purchaser" as, among other
things, any person or family-owned business in possession of at least $5 million in
investments).
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7).
53 See Primer,supra note 46.
54 See id. (listing some of the rules that the Advisers Act includes, such as
disclosing "[r]ecord-keeping;
[s]ubstantive
content
of advisory contracts;
[a]dvertising; [c]ustody of client funds and assets; and [p]roxy voting").
55 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (emphasis added).
56 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
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adviser has had fewer than fifteen clients in the past twelve
months, does not represent himself to the investing public as an
investment adviser, and does not advise a registered investment
57
company.
The exemption in the Advisers Act goes on to state that for
the sake of meeting the exemption, investors, limited partners,
and shareholders in the investment company do not count as
clients of an investment advisor. 58 The reason for this rule is
that from the time the Act was originally passed, the word
"client" has specifically meant a person or entity receiving direct
investment advice from an investment advisor.5 9 Therefore, as
applied to hedge fund advisers, each of the hedge funds they
manage count as one "client" because that is the only entity that
is actually receiving direct investment advice. The adviser is
making decisions for the sole benefit of the fund and not taking
into account the interests or concerns of any individual investor
or shareholder. 60 The effect of this is that a hedge fund adviser
will not have to register under the Advisers Act unless he
manages fifteen or more hedge funds. 6 1 Along with the Company
Act, this exemption greatly benefits the hedge funds and their
managers in allowing them to more completely attempt to
achieve their funds' financial goals free from unnecessary
disclosures, trading restrictions, or time constraints.
57 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). There are other factors that may allow an adviser to
succeed in gaining the exemption, but these are not used as often and are beyond the
scope of this Note. Notice the interactivity of the Company Act with the Advisers
Act-both adviser and his or her fund must be exempt under each Act in order for
the hedge fund to avoid registering with the SEC.
58 Id. This clarification of the term "client" reads in full:
For purposes of determining the number of clients of an investment adviser
under this paragraph, no shareholder,partner, or beneficial owner of a
business development company, as defined in this subchapter, shall be
deemed to be a client of such investment adviser unless such person is a
client of such investment adviser separate and apart from his status as a
shareholder, partner, or beneficial owner ....
Id. (emphasis added).
59 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207-08 (1985).
60 See MacHarg, supra note 1, at 66:
Under Rule 203(b)(3)-1 promulgated by the SEC, a limited partnership
(such as a hedge fund) generally is a single client of any general partner or
other person acting as an investment adviser to the partnership. An
adviser may count a limited partnership as a single client as long as the
adviser provides advice based on the partnership's investment objectives,
and not the individual objectives of the limited partners.
61 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
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The Securities Act of 1933

The 1933 Act 62 requires that any public offering of a security
be preceded by a "full and fair disclosure" of what exactly the
security is and by whom exactly it is being offered. 63 The goal is
to protect the average investor and allow him access to important
information as he decides whether to invest.64 Like with the
other Acts, hedge funds can be excused from this Act's
registration requirement if designed to fall within its two
exemptions. The first exemption is usually referred to as the
"private offering" exemption 65 and exempts "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering." 66 This means that
hedge funds are exempt from any initial filing responsibility as
long as the fund is not offered to the broad investing public. 67
The Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston PurinaCo. 68 explained the
reasoning of the exemption, stating that "private offerings" are
those made to informed, experienced investors. Investors such as
these have demonstrated the ability to make their own
investment decisions after performing their own research, and
who thus do not need the extra regulatory protections. 69
The second exemption under this Act requires that the fund
meets the criteria set forth in Rule 506 under Regulation D 70 of
the 1933 Act. 71 This provision provides that as long as a fund has
not made solicitations to the public regarding the offering and
has involved only "accredited investors" or no more that thirtyfive "unaccredited investors," it is considered a "private offering"
and no registration is necessary. 72
The term "accredited
investor" means any person or couple with a net worth of at least
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa.
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
See MacHarg, supra note 1, at 63.
THE REPORT, supra note 1,at 14.
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
See THE REPORT, supra note 1,at 14.
346 U.S. 119 (1953).
See id. at 125-27; see also THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.

70 See MacHarg, supra note 1, at 64 (informing that Regulation D was adopted
by the SEC in 1982). It is worth noting that hedge funds were already on the SEC's
radar in 1982, but when the SEC promulgated Regulation D, it made sure to
reiterate that limited partners and shareholders of companies were still not
considered "clients." See Revjsion of Certain Exemptions from Registration for
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389,
47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 & 11,251 to 11,259 (Mar. 16, 1982).
71 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
72 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007); see also MacHarg, supra note 1, at 63.
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$1 million, or an income the last two years of at least $200,000$300,000 for couples-with the reasonable expectation that it will
continue. It also includes any company, partnership, bank, trust,
or pension or employee benefit plan with at least $5 million in
assets.7 3 This exemption works nicely for hedge funds, as the
ideal investor will normally fit this description.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Lastly, the 1934 Act 74 picks up the regulatory baton where
the 1933 Act leaves off, focusing on perpetual registration
requirements demanded once a security has begun trading on the
open market.7 5 The 1934 Act demands that any issuer of a
publicly traded security be registered with the SEC.7 6 The
purpose of the statute is to regulate the securities markets, make
pertinent information accessible to buyers and sellers, protect
investors and markets from fraud and manipulation, and offer
remedies if fraud does take place. 77 The 1934 Act provides that
only issuers of publicly offered securities having at least 500
investors are required to register with the SEC. 78 In order to
avoid registration, then, hedge funds must only ensure that the
number of investors in the fund does not exceed 499.79 This
exemption, along with the exemptions in the other three Acts,
allows hedge funds who so choose to dodge registration
requirements, thereby gaining more flexibility in their strategies
and expenses.
4.

B.

The Concerns of the SEC and the Solutions It Sought

1.

Framing the Concerns

The SEC's most recent hedge fund study, Implications of the
Growth of Hedge Funds ("The Report"),8 0 was requested due to
the unprecedented growth that the hedge fund sector had
experienced. The SEC wanted to understand why the sector was
73 17 C.F.R. § 230.501; see also THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
74 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-ll (2000).
75

See MacHarg, supra note 1, at 64.

See id. at 64-65.
See id. (citing L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATIONJ 84 (1951)).
78 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005); see also MacHarg, supra note 1, at
64-65 (going over this Act's exemptions in more detail).
79 See MacHarg, supra note 1, at 65.
80 See THE REPORT, supra note 1.
76

77

20081

TOO FAR OVER THE HEDGE

growing as fast as it was and to analyze whether investors were
protected enough as this growth continued.8 1 The SEC was quite
candid about believing they did not have nearly enough
information on hedge funds-even on a simple level. The goal of
the study was to shed light on, among other things, how hedge
funds operate, the risks involved, the ability of funds or
managers to defraud investors, and their impact on financial
82
markets.
The SEC's first concern in its Report was the recent
This
unparalleled growth seen in the hedge fund sector.8 3
the
on
funds
hedge
development made the potential effects of
markets that much more substantial, worrying the SEC
considerably.8 4 Tied to this, the SEC was fearful that the growth
would lead to a surge in hedge fund fraud perpetrated by the
85
funds and their managers that would severely affect investors.
The Proposed Rule listed several variations used to lure
investors,8 6 including how certain hedge funds had overstated
their past success, overstated or misstated the returns for
current investors-causing them to stay invested when in fact
they were being charged substantial undisclosed fees-and
misappropriated their investors' assets in other ways.8 7 With
new methods of hedge fund fraud still being uncovered,8 8 the
SEC implied in its report that more "transparency"8 9 was
absolutely required.

81 See id. at 1-2.
82 See, e.g., id. at 2, 76-79 (listing all of the concerns the SEC voiced in The
Report).
83 See, e.g., Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,174 to 45,175 (explaining that
from 1993 through 2003, hedge funds assets rose "fifteenfold" and the number of
funds increased "fivefold"); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
84 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,174 to 45,176.
85 See id. at 45,175 to 45,176 (stating how the growth has been correlated with a
"troubling" increase in the number of hedge fund fraud "enforcement" cases the SEC
had recently brought).
86 See id.
87

See id.

See id. (detailing some of the innovative types of fraud, including conspiring
with mutual fund managers during the mutual fund market-timing scandals).
89 Edwards, supra note 4, at 42-43 (presenting several types of "transparency"
that have been suggested of hedge funds, including looking through to the fund's
holdings on a periodic basis, or having more "transparency" regarding the amount of
risk associated with a fund's portfolio).
88
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Another concern highlighted by the SEC regarded the socalled "retailization" of the hedge fund sector. 90 "Retailization"
refers to the recent trend of the "wrong type" of investor gaining
the ability to invest in hedge funds through certain channels. 91
Specifically, the SEC was anxious that investors such as
pension funds, university endowments, foundations, and
"unsophisticated" investors were placing their assets in these
funds without a full understanding of the risk to which they
would be exposed. 92 Unsophisticated, or "retail,"93 investors are
also investing more in this sector due to the development of
registered "funds of hedge funds" ("FOFH"s). These FOFHs can
be offered to the investing public because they are registered,
even though the underlying hedge funds they invest in may not
be registered.
This can lead to inexperienced investors
committing significant assets to these funds, perhaps without
appreciating the true potential for losses. 94 All of these concerns
elucidated by the SEC caused the agency to take action.
2.

The Solution Sought by the SEC
The SEC, in response to the Report, presented its solution,
entitled "Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge
Fund Advisers; Proposed Rule" ("Proposed Rule"). The Proposed
Rule reflected the SEC's determination to amend certain aspects
of the Advisers Act. 95 The SEC summarized the goals it had in
mind with the rule-change: "The rule and rule amendments are
designed to provide the protections afforded by the Advisers Act
to investors in hedge funds, and to enhance the Commission's
ability to protect our nation's securities markets."96 The SEC's
commissioner majority decided to adopt the Final Rule, 97
90 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,176 to 45,177.

91 See id.
92 See id. ("Hedge funds are thus today being purchased by entities that are not
traditional hedge fund investors.").
93 See Edwards, supra note 4, at 36 (explaining that less wealthy investors are
referred to as "retail" investors).
94 See, e.g., Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,176. In addition to these worries,
there have been others mentioned as well, including abusive short-selling practices
by funds and the sometimes exorbitant fees which are charged. See, e.g., Cox
Testimony, supra note 30.
95 See generally Proposed Rule, supranote 9.
96 Final Rule, supra note 16.
97 See id. pt. II.A-D (proposing what it felt were necessary amendments to the
Advisers Act and the reasoning behind the changes).
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notwithstanding a dissent by two of the five SEC commissioners,
Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins, 98 and the significant
amount of commentary received after the initial Proposed Rule
was presented. 99
The most important amendment implemented was to change
the wording of section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act. 10 0 Under its
original wording, as long as other necessary criteria were met, if
an adviser had less than fifteen clients in the past twelve
months, that adviser was excused from registering with the
SEC.10 1 Just as importantly, the same subsection goes on to
immediately state that "no shareholder, partner, or beneficial
owner of a business development company.., shall be deemed a
client. ' 102 Because hedge fund investors fall squarely within this
description as to what is a "non-client," only the fund itself is
considered a client and, in turn, only an adviser managing more
than fourteen funds must still register with the SEC. The
amendment was administered to combat this reality.
The SEC determined that section 203(b)(3) would now
include a "look-through" component which would require a
"private fund," when counting "clients" in order to meet the
exemption, to look through the hedge fund itself and count as
clients of the fund the number of owners and investors that are
invested in the fund.10 3 An adviser of a domestic fund that had
more than fourteen investors in the previous twelve months
would have to register with the SEC, as long as the fund had at

See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,197 to 45,200. In brief, Commissioners
Glassman and Atkins felt that more alternative solutions should be considered
before this rule-making was undertaken, that the majority's stated concerns for the
rule did not hold up under "scrutiny," and that the new registration requirements
would divert the already limited resources of the SEC. See Final Rule, supra note 13
(Cynthia A. Glassman & Paul S. Atkins, Commissioners, dissenting).
99See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing the breakdown of
the comments received).
100 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000); see Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. II.C
(relaying how this exemption was originally revisited in 1980 and again in 1985, and
was meant to exempt entities, in the opinion of the SEC, that did not include private
investment pools such as hedge funds, and why therefore the amendments were
necessary and appropriate).
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
102 Id.
103 See Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. II.D ("Rule 203(b)(3)-2") (discussing how to
use the look-through provision).
98
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least $25 million in assets. 10 4 This meant many hedge funds
would now fall under the auspices of mandatory registration.
In amending section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, the SEC
limited the "look-through" provision to ensure that only those
entities which would meet the definition of what it called a
"private fund"10 5 would be compelled to register. The SEC
further stated that a "private fund" would be defined as any
investment entity that possessed each of three characteristics
"shared by virtually all hedge funds, and that differentiate hedge
funds from other pooled investment vehicles."1 0 6 The first
characteristic asked whether the fund would have had to register
with the SEC as an "investment company" under the Company
Act,10 7 but for the exceptions that the Company Act provides.1 08
The second characteristic involved the various "lockup
period" provisions normally used by hedge funds.1 09 A lockup
provision is one of several "liquidity provisions" that a fund may
employ, which puts restrictions on how and when an investor can
retrieve his assets from the investment vehicle. 110 Lockup
provisions state that for a certain period of time after initially
investing in the hedge fund, the investor may not withdraw his
monetary investment.'
The SEC determined that almost
always, these initial "lockup periods," when dealing with hedge
funds, are less than two years in length.1 12 Therefore, the SEC
stated that if an investment pool has a "lockup period" and it is
less than two years long, it would meet the second of the three
characteristics needed to be defined as a "private fund."" 13
104
105

See id.
See id.

Id. pt. II.E ('Definition of 'Private Fund' ").
See id. The Final Rule expressly states that this would not affect most clients
that are "business organizations, including insurance companies, broker-dealers,
and banks, but [that it would be] required to look through many types of pooled
investment vehicles investing in securities, including hedge funds." Id.
108 For a reminder of the Company Act exceptions, see supra notes 44-52 and
accompanying text.
109 Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. II.E.2 ("Redemption Within Two Years").
110 See
David Harper, Introduction to Hedge Funds-Part One,
106
107

INVESTOPEDIA.COM, Nov. 26, 2003, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/112603.

asp ("Liquidity provisions vary, but invested funds may be difficult to withdraw 'atwill.' ").
111 See id.
112

See Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. II.E.2 ("Redemption Within Two Years").

113 See id. Ironically, singling out this characteristic backfired. When the Final

Rule went into effect, many hedge funds just increased their initial 'lockup periods"
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The last characteristic necessary to make an investment pool
a "private fund" regards the actual skills of the adviser of the
fund and what he holds himself out to be. 114 This means that the
fund will only be recognized as having this characteristic if the
fund attempts to gain and invest assets by informing potential
investors of the adviser's skills, ability, or expertise. 115 Thus,
between the amendment to section 203(b)(3) and the
announcement of what the term "private fund" would refer to,
the SEC had effectively constructed a law that would specifically
of many
require managers of hedge funds-but not the managers
1 16
SEC.
the
with
register
pools-to
investment
other
C. How the "Solution"Has Led to Uncertainty
Mr. Goldstein Goes to Washington
Even with all of the commotion surrounding the Final
Rule, 117 no manager or fund was willing to challenge the
authority of the SEC1 18 or the constitutionality of changing the
definition of "client"-a term that had been clearly and
universally understood for more than half a century to mean one
who receives direct investment advice. No one was willing, that
is, except for one-Phillip Goldstein. 11 9
Phillip Goldstein has managed his own "value-driven" hedge
fund since 1993.120 He is also a "widely-quoted expert on value
investing and corporate governance."' 12 1 He was determined to
challenge what he believed was a rule based on "myths" the SEC
used to support its position. 122 After a lengthy trial and to the
1.

to two years or longer, thereby allowing their funds to remain exempt from
registration. Weiner, supra note 32.
114 See Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. II.E.3 ("Advisory Skills, Ability, or
Expertise").
115See id.
116There were also additional amendments made to various sections of the
Advisers Act related to this principle of hedge fund manager registration, which are
beyond the scope of this Note. See Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. II.F-K.
117 See, e.g., supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (relating the number of
comment letters received by the SEC, including eighty-three letters in opposition).
118 See Goldstein Interview, supra note 21.
119 Id.
120

Bulldog Investors, http://www.bulldoginvestors.com

(last visited Sept. 16,

2007).
121

Id.

See Phillip Goldstein, Remarks at the Hedge Funds Best Practices 2005
Conference: Why We Are Suing the SEC (Feb. 28, 2005) (on file with author).
122
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astonishment of many, 123 Mr. Goldstein was handed a favorable,
unanimous decision: the rule would be vacated on the grounds
' 124
that it was completely "arbitrary."
Although there are many reasons why the Final Rule should
not have been passed, 125 Mr. Goldstein focused his lawsuit on a
purely legal argument-that the Commission was incorrect in its
interpretation of section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act. 126 In his
opinion, Judge Randolph pointed out that this was precisely one
of the issues that the two dissenting commissioners of the SEC
27
originally mentioned when the amendment was proposed.
That dissent had fallen on deaf ears, with the SEC believing that
because the Advisers Act did not specifically define the word
"client," its meaning was ambiguous. 128 This ambiguity gave the
SEC, as a federal regulatory agency, the authority to interpret
the word as it felt appropriate. 129 The Court, however, was quick
to point out that "[t]he lack of a statutory definition of a word
30
does not necessarily render the meaning of a word ambiguous."'
Further, it should be remembered that "'words of the statute
should be read in context, the statute's place in the overall
statutory scheme should be considered, and the problem
Congress sought to solve should be taken into account' to
determine whether Congress has foreclosed the agency's
13
interpretation." 1
The court then applied this rule of law to the word and
surrounding statute at issue.' 32 This enabled the court to see if
the SEC's definition of the word "client" was reasonable.1 33 In so
123 See, e.g., Becky Yerak, Hedge Funds Win in Court: Appeals Panel Strikes
Down SEC Rule Try, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2006, at B1 (quoting Michael Gray, an
attorney at Schwartz Cooper who advises hedge funds, as saying, "I'm blown away
by the court's decision").
124 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
125 See infra Part II for a discussion of those reasons.
126 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878.
127 Id.; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,199 n.35 (Cynthia A.
Glassman & Paul S. Atkins, Commissioners, dissenting) (disagreeing with the
Commissioner majority, explaining that section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act is not
in conflict with the rest of the Advisers Act and that "client" has been understood to
mean receiving direct advice).
128 See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878.
130

Id.
Id.

'3'

Id. (quoting PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

129

132 Id. at 878-84.
133 See id. at 880-84.
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doing, the court made several notable points. First, the court
discussed how in 1980, Congress amended section 203(b)(3) of the
Advisers Act to include language that made clear that no
partner, shareholder, or beneficial owner of a business
development company should be considered a client for the
purposes of the Act.13 4 Further, the court pointed to how the SEC
added a "safe harbor" provision to the Advisers Act. 135 This "safe
harbor" allowed advisers to count certain limited partnerships as
single clients without looking through to the investors. 136 The
motivation was to "provide 'greater certainty' about the meaning
of the term [client]. '"137 Perhaps most importantly, the Goldstein
decision reminded that in proposing the safe harbor provision,
the SEC wrote that "when 'an adviser to an investment pool
manages the assets of the pool [as if the assets belonged to one
group, and not to individual investors],... it appears appropriate
to view the pool-rather than each participant-as a client of the
adviser.' "138 It is clear then, that even the SEC has agreed that
investors in a hedge fund should not be considered clients of the
adviser when the adviser is managing the assets solely in order
to achieve the goals of the fund itself.
This was a concept, Judge Randolph pointed out, which had
been discussed and confirmed in Lowe v. SEC.139 There, the
Supreme Court determined that although the petitioners were
not registered with the SEC under the Advisers Act, they must
140
still be permitted to write and publish investment newsletters.
The argument turned on the nature of the petitioners'
relationship with the readers of the newsletter, and if a
relationship was found to exist, whether it was an "advisory

134

See id. at 878.

135 See id. at 879 n.5.
136 Id. (citing Definition of "Client" of Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes
Relating to Limited Partnerships, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 956, 50 Fed.
Reg. 8740, 8740-41 (proposed Mar. 5, 1985)).
137
138

Id.
Id. at 880.

139 472 U.S. 181 (1985). Poignantly, this is a case that Mr. Goldstein had sent
directly to the SEC in a comment letter in an attempt to convince it to not pass the
adviser registration amendment. Letter from Phillip Goldstein, President,
Opportunity Partners L.P.; and Gen. Partner, Kimball & Winthrop, Inc., to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Sept. 25, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposedls73004/pgoldstein092504.pdf.
140 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 203-11.
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relationship."' 14 1 Which type of relationship exists "depend[s]
largely on the character of the advice rendered." 142 In practice,
"[p]ersons engaged in the investment advisory profession 'provide
personalized advice attuned to a client's concerns.' "143
The
advice has to be given to a specific client in order to achieve their
unique financial goals for the relationship to be considered an
"advisory relationship." The Supreme Court in Lowe recognized
that because the advice was not structured to satisfy the needs of
any one reader, the petitioners' activities did not fall within the
coverage of the Advisers Act.1 44 The Goldstein decision shared
the same sentiment regarding the relationship that hedge fund
advisers have with the investors of the fund, and how the
relationship is not a "direct" one: "This type of direct relationship
exists between the adviser and the fund [itself], but not between
the adviser and the investors in the fund.1 4 5
As one final declaration, Judge Randolph also made clear
that the SEC's interpretation of the term "client" fell "outside the
bounds of reasonableness."'1 46
The "reasonableness" of a
particular interpretation is dependent on how it "fit[s]" with the
language of the statute, if the rest of the statute is still coherent
and if it parallels the purpose of the statute in question.1 47 The
SEC's fought-for interpretation, according to the court, "comes
close to violating the plain language of the statute. At best it is
counterintuitive to characterize the investors in a hedge fund as
the 'clients' of the adviser." 148 It is "counterintuitive," the court
explained, because if an investor is a "client" of the fund, the
investor is owed certain fiduciary duties that are owed to all
clients. 149 These fiduciaries duties may, in certain cases, come
into conflict with fiduciary duties that the adviser has to another
of his clients-the fund itself.15 0 The potential "conflicts of
141

See id. at 207-208, 210.

142 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880 (discussing what the Court in Lowe had held).

143 Id. (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 208).
144 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 210-11 ("We therefore conclude that petitioners'
publications fall within the statutory exclusion ... and that none of the petitioners is
an 'investment adviser' as defined in the Act.").
145 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880.
146 Id. at 880-81.
147 See id. at 881 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir.
1990)).
148 Id. (citing Am. Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
149 See id. at 881-82.
150 See id. at 880 (giving as an example of a potential conflict of interest a hedge
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interest" that would arise if this investors-as-clients scenario was
correct illuminates why the SEC's interpretation of the word
"client" was "unreasonable."' 151 As one commentator put it, "the
[Final Rule] carved out an exception from the exceptions [of the
Advisers Act and t]he court found that the SEC did not justify
152
this exception."
2.

The Hearings, the Testimony, the Uncertainty
1 53
Phillip Goldstein's victory was not a total surprise to him,
1
5
4
but it caught many people completely off-guard
and added to
55
what was already a controversial topic.
The summer which
followed was filled with voices from both sides, some stating that
more steps need to be taken to reign in hedge funds, 156 and others
lauding the decision as a step in the right direction-mainly, to
not require hedge funds to register. 15 7 The debate centered, and
continues to center, on what is the best course of action: Should
the government focus on better enforcement of the numerous
anti-fraud laws that already apply to hedge funds and their
managers, or should Congress enact new laws to alleviate the
SEC's fears and allow it to accomplish its stated mission more
158
freely?

fund about to go bankrupt, and how the correct advice to give to the fund itself-i.e.,

the adviser's client-would be to take all possible action to "remain solvent," but how
the correct advice that the adviser should give to the investors of the fund-i.e., the
individuals that the SEC would like to refer to as the adviser's "clients"-would be to
sell their share of the fund immediately, which conflicts with a fund's goal of
"remaining solvent").
151See id. at 881-84.
152 See Mark J. Astarita, Court Strikes New Hedge Fund Rule, SEC LAW.COM,
June 24, 2006, http://www.seclaw.com/docs/HedgeFundRuleStrickenO62406.htm
[hereinafter Astarita, Court Strikes Rule].
153 See, e.g., E-mail from Phillip Goldstein, Principal, Bulldog Investors, to
author (Nov. 2, 2006, 19:25 EST) (on file with author) ("Basically, the only way we
could have lost [was] if the court ignored the merits and deferred completely to the
SEC.").
154 See, e.g., Yerak, supra note 123; see also supra text accompanying note 123.
155Astarita, Court Strikes Rule, supra note 152.
156 See, e.g., Jacob H. Zamansky, Two Rights Equal One Wrong, FORBES.COM,
June 28, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/columnists/2006/06/28/hedge-fund-hearingscommentary-cxjz_0628zamansky.html
(writing that although the Goldstein
decision was legally correct, it highlights the fact that more regulation is needed).
157 See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 32 (announcing that the Goldstein decision was
correct, necessary, and beneficial).
158 Liz Moyer, Senate Weighs Regulations, supra note 29.
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Of those disappointed with the ruling, some of the most vocal
voices came from the Senate, where hearings were held on the
issue of hedge fund regulation in the days following the
decision.1 5 9 For instance, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) felt that
the legislature has to recreate securities law to make it more
applicable to hedge funds and stricter regarding the activities of
hedge funds. 160 Perhaps as a symbol of the utter uncertainty
could
surrounding current hedge fund regulation, the Legislature
16 1
not even finalize who had jurisdiction over hedge funds.
Among the other voices, that of the SEC was the loudest.
Immediately following the decision, the SEC stated that it would
reconsider its approach to hedge fund regulation and activity,
more seriously weigh alternatives to what it proposed, and
consider whether to appeal the decision.' 62 Christopher Cox,
chairman of the SEC, then testified in front of the Senate
Banking Committee. Interestingly, he made sure to state at the
outset that what he was about to say was only his own opinion
and did not necessarily reflect the sentiments of his fellow
This seemingly insignificant statement
commissioners. 163
underscores the complete unsettledness of current hedge fund
regulation and how no one really knows what the conclusion will
be. After giving that caveat, Chairman Cox stressed that the
164
SEC still retained the same concerns regarding hedge funds
that had initially moved it to propose and promulgate the Final
Rule. He also made recommendations that the financial criteria
an investor must meet before being eligible to invest in hedge
159

Id.

160 Id. (describing hedge funds, in a negative light, as the "Wild West of [the]

financial markets," and arguing why they need more regulation).
161 Liz Moyer, Hedge Hogs, FORBES.COM, June 28, 2006, http://www.forbes.com
business/2006/06/28/hedgefund-senate-regulations-cx m_0628hedge.html ("Already
a turf war is brewing. The Judiciary Committee is clashing with colleagues on the
U.S. Senate Banking Committee, who claim that hedge funds ... are their exclusive
jurisdiction.").
162 See Timothy Spangler, Comment: US Court Decision on Hedge Fund
Manager Supervision, HEDGEWEEK.COM, June 30, 2006, http://www.hedgeweek.com/
articles/printpage.jsp?contentid=27223 (registration required) (explaining the
rationale behind the court's decision and what the SEC planned to do next); see also
Yerak, supra note 123 (quoting Chairman Cox, who said that the decision "requires
that going forward we re-evaluate the agency's approach to hedge fund activity").
163 Cox Testimony, supra note 30 ("I should emphasize at the outset... that my
testimony today reflects my views ... and does not represent the position of the fivemember Commission. The views I am expressing this morning are solely my own.").
164 Id.; see also supra Part I.B.1 (explaining the fears and concerns of the SEC).
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funds be raised in order to prevent "unsophisticated" investors
from having access to hedge funds. 16 5 In addition, he reminded
Congress that it could pass legislation if it saw fit, and explained
how the SEC would lean more on related agencies and
associations in understanding and monitoring hedge funds. 166 In
sum, the Chairman's testimony made clear that, according to
him, the correct balance to strike regarding hedge fund
regulation has not yet been realized, and if it had, the
Commission had not yet given it enough analysis.
All of these dire opinions were contrasted by many
applauding the decision and expressing why it was positive for
everyone involved.
Some reiterated that two of the five
commissioners had dissented from the Final Rule from the
beginning.1 67 Many also announced the decision as necessary
because the Final Rule did not actually serve to protect investors
and they felt that the Final Rule "met a well-deserved fate" with
68
the Goldstein decision.
As the debate continued in the months following the ruling,
Chairman Cox announced that his agency would not pursue
appealing the Goldstein decision. 169 Because the ruling was
"based on several grounds and was unanimous," Chairman Cox
explained that "further appeal would be futile."' 70 This was yet
another twist in the current saga that is hedge fund regulation.
Ultimately, the questions regarding hedge fund registration and
regulation remained and a new, broad question was presented:
Was the SEC's failure to further regulate hedge funds through
the use of the Final Rule a positive or negative development for
the industry and its investors? Part II of this Note proposes that
it was a completely positive development for all parties involved
for several reasons, and explains how any other outcome would
have only produced more problems.
165

See Cox Testimony, supra note 30 (proposing that the definition of an

"accredited investor" be changed to demanding a net worth of $1.5 million for an
individual to be eligible, up from the current, lower threshold, which only requires a
net worth of $1 million to be eligible).
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., Mark J.
Astarita, Registration of Hedge Fund Managers:
Bureaucracy Without Benefit, SEC LAw.COM, http://www.seclaw.com/docs/NewHedge
FundAdvisorRule.htm [hereinafter Astarita, Registration of Managers].
168 See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 32.
169 S.E.C. Decides It Won't Appeal on Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at
C9.
170

Id.
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II. WHY THE SEC's FAILURE WAS IMPERATIVE TO PROTECT THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE INVESTORS, THE ADVISERS, AND THE SEC
ITSELF

The Goldstein court's striking down of the Final Rule was a
positive and necessary event because it will benefit all investors,
hedge fund advisers, the funds themselves, and even the SEC.
The court explained the ruling on concrete legal grounds and
seemed to reprimand the SEC for their chosen course of action.
This Part of the Note will go beyond the court's discussion. It
will examine the shortcomings of the rule from many different
angles, which will illuminate how the rejection of the rule is safer
and more productive for investors and advisers alike. Finally,
this Part will demonstrate how the failure of the SEC to further
regulate hedge funds efficiently or lawfully highlights some
serious flaws in the methodology, rule construction, and general
practices used by the agency. This recognition of the SEC's
shortcomings may spur positive action to correct the
inefficiencies.

A.

The SEC's Reasons for the FinalRule Were Not Reasonable

The SEC's reasons for the Final Rule appear to be nothing
more than pretext, 17 1 which is the first reason that it was positive
and necessary for the amendments to be vacated-it would not
have made sense to allow it to live on, with investors still not
truly protected. The first reason that the SEC gave for the
registration demands was that it did not have basic data on
hedge funds and did not know how they worked or to what extent
they utilized particular strategies. 172 The reality though, is that
the SEC has access to the statistics of approximately 1,250 hedge
funds. 173 If the SEC yearns to understand hedge174funds, that is
quite a significant sample into which it may delve.
171

See Final Rule, supra note 13 (Cynthia A. Glassman & Paul S. Atkins,

Commissioners, dissenting) ("The pretext for the rule does not withstand scrutiny.");
see also Astarita, Registrationof Managers,supra note 167 ("[T]he justifications [for
the new requirements] do not support the concept of registration.").
172 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
173 See Cox Testimony, supra note 30 (referencing how many funds were already
registered with the SEC before the Final Rule was passed). Over 1,250 funds were
registered. Id.
174 See Comment Letter from Phillip Goldstein, President, Opportunity Partners
L.P., and Gen. Partner, Kimball & Winthrop, Inc., Regarding Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2266 (Sept. 10, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/
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The SEC also stated that the Final Rule was necessary to
curb the growing number of fraud cases involving hedge funds
and their advisers. 175 The SEC pointed to absolute numbers of
cases, 176 rather than an increase in the ratio of cases of hedge
fund fraud, to prove its point. Even the SEC admitted that there
was no increase in the ratio of fraud cases involving hedge funds
even as the sector exploded. 177 It is a normal reality that as
something grows, and there is more of it, there will always be
more instances of that "thing" not performing as intended or not
living up to its user's expectations. The key is that as long as the
ratio of unexpected performances does not increase, it is
irrelevant that the technical number of instances does increaseit is to be expected.
Related to this was the SEC's belief that the Final Rule was
necessary to give investors added protection due to an alleged
dearth of hedge fund-applicable regulation. 178 This is curious, as
there is already much federal regulation in place that applies to
hedge fund managers. As the commissioner majority stated,
even though exempt advisers do not have to file paperwork with
the SEC, the advisers "must nonetheless comply with the
[Advisers] Act's antifraud provisions." 179 In the Advisers Act,
section 206 outlaws various types of fraud-that targeting clients
and that which is characterized as any practice that is
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."'1 80 Further, the funds
1 81
are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act.
There are yet other anti-fraud laws that always apply to
hedge funds and their managers. In the 1933 Act, hedge funds
are completely covered under section 17(q)(a), which involves
protecting against funds selling any securities through
pgoldstein091004.pdf (pointing out that the SEC should begin its data-gathering
process with those funds that are already registered).
175 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (explaining the SEC's fear of
fraud and the various forms that it may take).

176 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,197 to 45,198 (pointing to the number
of cases as forty-six).
177 See, e.g., THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 73 ("There is no evidence indicating
that hedge funds or their advisers engage disproportionately [as compared to other
investment sectors] in fraudulent activity.").
178 See supra Part I.B.2.
179 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,173.
is015 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) to (4) (2000).
181 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,173 n.12 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2007)).
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misleading or fraudulent information.18 2 Also, there is the USA
Patriot Act, related to money laundering statutes, which
demands registration of a hedge fund if it meets basic
requirements, such as having an initial "lockup period" of less
than two years and over $1 million in assets "at the end of the
most recent calendar quarter." 18 3 Therefore, there is a sincere
question as to what this new regulation would have added in
addition to what is already in place. Essentially, it demonstrates
an unfortunate lack of focus by the SEC.
The last main concern that the SEC expressed, the
"retailization" of hedge funds, involved a fear that as the hedge
fund industry grows in popularity, more "unsophisticated"
investors will continue gaining access to these aggressive
investments, without even being aware of it in some cases, such
18 4
as where a pension fund invests on behalf of its participants.
This concern, though, is also overblown. Pension fund investing
in hedge funds actually totaled just one percent of all pension
fund assets at the time of the Proposed Rule.18 5 Moreover,
pension funds may not need this extra guidance from the SEC, as
these funds are managed by professional money managers who
are fiduciaries to the funds in addition to falling under the
supervision of the Department of Labor. 186 This all demonstrates
that the SEC's defense of the rule was based on pretextual
grounds. Therefore, because there was no justifiable reason for
the particular amendments imposed, it is positive for all involved
that the amendments were vacated.
The Final Rule Was Born of Faulty Construction
Even if the Final Rule had been upheld by the Court, the
Final Rule would not have produced the SEC's intended results
because it was constructed in such a way that would have
prevented it from serving its stated purpose of requiring
B.

182 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000).
183 See MacHarg, supra note 1, at 69. Investors are protected in even more ways

as well. For instance, states generally have their own anti-fraud provisions. See
Joseph C. Long, A Hedge Fund Primer, Order No. 6855, 1503 PLI/Corp. 233, 248
(2005). Separately, any hedge fund investing in commodities must register with the

CFTC under the Commodities Exchange Act and currently, many hedge funds are
registered with the CFTC for this reason. See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
184 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
185 See Proposed Rule, supranote 9, at 45,198.
186

Id.
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registration and protecting investors. Recall that under the
Final Rule, any investment pool which possessed three key
characteristics would be considered a "private fund" and would
then be compelled to register with the SEC. Recall also that the
SEC designed it so that only hedge funds, for the most part,
would meet all three characteristics. In essence, the "private
fund designation" rule created a de facto registration
requirement for hedge funds to allow the SEC to monitor them
more fully.' 8 7 Shockingly, though, due to its poor design, the SEC
left a gaping loophole in the Final Rule that would have
potentially allowed most-if not all-hedge funds to remain
exempt from registration.
The second of the three characteristics needed to be a
"private fund" is that the fund must have an initial "lockup
18
period," relating to new assets invested, of less than two years. 8
What the SEC did not plan for was that many hedge funds would
simply lengthen their initial "lockup periods" to two years in
order to remain exempt.'8 9 This would allow hedge funds to
remain exempt even under the Final Rule because the funds
would not meet the second prong of the "private fund" criteria
and therefore would not have to register. This was a wide chasm
of a loophole, an enormous oversight, since it would have
prevented the Final Rule from serving its stated purpose of
requiring hedge funds to register with the SEC in order to help
the SEC learn about and monitor the industry. 90 In fact, before
the Final Rule went into effect, many hedge funds had already
extended their "lockup periods" to meet the exemption, or
informed their investors that they intended to do so.191 The
See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
189 See Gregory Zuckerman & Ian McDonald, Hedge Funds Avoid SEC
Registration Rule-Some Big Firms Change Lockups, Stop Accepting New
Investments to Take Advantage of Loopholes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2005, at C1.
190 See id. ("These [hedge funds] have adopted measures to take advantage of a
loophole provided by the [SEC]-potentially undercutting the SEC's efforts to
uncover fraud and get a better understanding of the growing business.").
191 See id. (stating that many funds, including some of the largest, took steps to
lengthen their "lockup periods" in reaction to the SEC's demands); see also Weiner,
supra note 32 (writing that many funds had already lengthened their "lockup
periods" to two years and "[m]any investors, knowing full well that agreeing to such
a lockup would result in their funds not being subject to SEC registration,
nevertheless agreed"). For instance, Kingdon, a twenty-two-year-old hedge fund with
over $4.5 billion under management, decided that it would not register by the
deadline because the fund would instead take advantage of this hole left unplugged
187
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ruling was therefore both positive and necessary. Since the Final
Rule was written so poorly, it would not have achieved the goals
intended and may have actually led to less investor autonomy
due to the longer "lockup periods."
Other rule construction issues similarly would have
prevented the rule from impeding the very fraud that it set out to
stifle. The SEC attempted to demonstrate the need for the Final
19 2
Rule by stating what fraud had occurred in specific cases.
What the majority failed to mention is that "[r]egistration [that
the Final Rule would have demanded] would not have prevented
the violations in the enforcement cases cited by [them]."193 This
came on the heels of the dissenting commissioners' comments in
the Proposed Rule, where they stated:
The 46 cases [of fraud] suggest that the typical "hedge fund"
fraud is perpetrated by an adviser that is too small to be
registered with the Commission, was registeredalready with the
Commission, or evaded registration requirements. Mandatory
hedge fund adviser registration would not add to the
Commission's ability to combat these types of fraud. 194
The fact that several of the enforcement cases were brought
against hedge funds that were already registered reinforces the
point that the Final Rule, as written, was without worth because
it would have failed to do what the SEC intended. Therefore, the
rejection of the Final Rule was beneficial because it will enable
the SEC to learn from its rule-construction mistakes in order to
fashion rules in the future that are truly useful in protecting
investors, instead of creating rules that give a false sense of
security.
C. The SEC's Shortcomings in EnforcingRegulations
Even if the new registration requirements had actually
added vital enforcement mechanisms which could not be easily
manipulated, unfortunately, it would not have allowed the SEC
to prevent more fraud. The SEC is ill-equipped to take on the
additional task of intense monitoring of hedge funds due to its
in the Final Rule. See Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 189.
192 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,175.
193 Final Rule, supra note 13 (Cynthia A. Glassman & Paul S. Atkins,
Commissioners, dissenting) ("Registration Would Not Have Prevented the Violations
in the Enforcement Cases Cited by the Majority").
194 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,197 to 45,198 (emphasis added).
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currently diminutive level of funding. 195 At the time of the Final
Rule, the SEC did not have the resources to monitor newly
registered hedge fund advisers; it did not even have the resources
to monitor the hedge funds that had registered voluntarily before
The dissenting
the SEC instituted its requirement. 196
such limited
with
SEC,
the
whether
commissioners queried
resources, should have been spending what resources it had on
hedge funds, which are utilized by less than one million
"sophisticated" investors and institutions, instead of focusing the
resources on "other, more traditional, areas"-i.e., mutual funds
and equities-which are utilized and depended on by over ninety
million investors. 9 7 The query, of course, was rhetorical-the
SEC should be focusing not on hedge funds, but on those sectors
that dominate the focus of the vast majority of investors. The
Court's rejection of the Final Rule will potentially allow the SEC
to refocus its spotlight on these more popular investment sectors.
Two case studies further demonstrate the SEC's lack of
enforcement or monitoring prowess. 198 The first case, involving
WorldCom, Inc., caused financial devastation to millions of
investors, with shareholder losses approximated to be as high as
$200 billion. 199 WorldCom's stock was publicly traded on a major
exchange, which required it to be registered under all applicable
securities statutes. The SEC, though, could not prevent the
fraud. A similar inability to protect investors was seen in the
recent mutual fund late-trading scandals. Even though every
See Yerak, supra note 123 ("It was clear that the SEC lacked the manpower
to do much in the way of enforcement .... " (quoting Stuart Feffer, Managing
Director of the Investment Management Practice, BearingPoint, Inc.)). Dissenting
Commissioners Glassman and Atkins expressed this sentiment bluntly: "[Tihe
Commission lacks the resources necessary to conduct frequent, comprehensive hedge
fund adviser examinations, and our lack of resources is a matter of public record."
Final Rule, supra note 13.
196 Final Rule, supra note 13 (Cynthia A. Glassman & Paul S. Atkins,
Commissioners, dissenting) ("[New registration requirements] seem[] unwise so soon
after we made the case that we did not have enough staff to oversee the existing pool
of registered advisers and funds.").
197 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,199.
198 See, e.g., Christopher Byron, Bring in the FBI-The SEC Isn't Fit to Be the
Beat Cop of Wall Street, N.Y. POST, Sept. 5, 2006, at 37 ("[T]he SEC's stature as an
arm of federal law enforcement [is not] enhanced by its at times almost comical
image on Wall Street as a lethargic bureaucracy filled with numskulls who can't get
out of their own way.").
199Barnaby J. Feder, WorldCom Agrees to Pay $750 Million in S.E.C. Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2003, at C6.
195
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mutual fund and its managers were registered with the SEC, 20 0
the SEC did not discover any of the illicit activity due to parties
being registered or due to any monitoring on the part of the
SEC. 20 1 The fraud was only discovered when whistleblowers
202
came forward to state commissioners.
The result has been the same specifically regarding the
defrauding of hedge fund investors. Kirk Wright, who was a
principal owner of International Management Associates ("IMA")
and International Management Associates Advisory Group
("IMAAG"), which each operated a series of hedge funds, was
charged with defrauding his investors of between $150 and $180
million. 20 3 Wright's funds were registered with the SEC and with
several states when the fraud took place. 20 4 The SEC, though,
never detected that anything was amiss until it was too late.
Potential fraudsters are just not worried enough about the
SEC because of its inability to detect fraud in most cases.
Perhaps that is because "the commission's lack of power gives it a
bark that only seems to scare those who obey the law already. 2 0 5
Therefore, the Goldstein decision was positive because it shines a
light on the deficiencies of current SEC enforcement policies and
illustrates how the SEC must amend its own agency before it
amends the laws related to hedge fund regulation.

200 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,198.
201 See Astarita, Registrationof Managers,supra note 167 (describing the SEC's

explanation that new registration is necessary due to the mutual fund scandals as a
"joke" because registration had nothing to do with any of the activity being
uncovered).
202 See id.
203 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Investment Manager Charged in
Collapse of $180 Million Hedge Funds (Mar. 29, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
gan/press/2006/03-29-06c.pdf.
204 See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 5-6, SEC v. Wright, No. 1 06-CV0438 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2006), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl
9581.pdf (noting the number of states in which Wright's funds, of which he was the
owner and manager, had been registered); see also Goldstein Interview, supra note
21 (noting that Wright was registered with the SEC and that it did not help prevent
the fraud, and noting that it will not help the investors get back any of their lost
money in the future).
205 Byron, supra note 198.
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D. Public Policy Reasons
The Fear of Overregulation
There is always a fear of overregulation; that is, regulation
that is not necessary or goes too far. Indeed, this has been one 20of6
the main criticisms of the Final' Rule from the beginning.
Overregulation, and all of the varied costs it entails, can act as
an impetus for investment companies to move their operations
outside of the U.S., or to decide not to do business here in the
first place. 20 7 This presents a real public policy concern because
of the economic benefits achieved by the U.S. broad markets due
to this activity, and because of the tax revenue the national
government would lose due to funds leaving. 20 8 In fact, former
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan pointed out that if
hedge funds feel stifled by the regulatory environment in the
more
U.S., they may simply move their funds off-shore in order 2to
09
easily obtain the performance returns their clients desire.
This fear of overregulation is of particular concern while
discussing the SEC. The SEC has a history of overstepping its
authority and the bounds of necessity in promulgating rules. 2 10
The Final Rule was one example, as the Goldstein court
confirmed. Another example was the "mutual fund governance
proposal" that the SEC presented in response to the mutual fund
market-timing scandals. 2 11 Most recently, the Commission was
1.

206 See Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,199 to 45,200 (reiterating that the
Hedge Fund Registration rule may not have been needed, and that the Commission
should have looked at alternative solutions and the voluminous information it had
access to before taking any drastic measures); see also Weiner, supra note 32
(describing the SEC's registration demands as "unnecessary").
207 See John Churchill, NYSE Chief John Thain Attacks "Excessive" Regulation,
REGISTEREDREP.COM, June 20, 2006, http://www.registeredrep.com/news/NYSEregulation-conference/index.html (noting that twenty-three of the twenty-five largest
initial public offerings of equities in 2005 took place outside the U.S., and that the
capital raised for the offerings also came from outside the U.S.).
208 See Telephone Interview with Perrie M. Weiner, Partner and Int'l Co-Chair,
Sec. Litig. Group, DLA Piper, in Queens, N.Y. (Aug. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Weiner
Interview] (telling the author how funds will look to move outside the U.S.).
209 See Weiner, supra note 32 (commenting that "[a]n off-shore exodus will
hardly result in more transparency" to allow the SEC to monitor the funds).
210 See Weiner Interview, supra note 208 ("[The] SEC has [a] history of pushing
inappropriate laws and losing out.").
211 See Cynthia Glassman, Comm'r, SEC, Addres to National Economists Club:
Observations of an Economist Commissioner on Leaving the SEC (July 6, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2006/spchO70606cag.htm (reiterating that this was
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ordered to "do the empirical homework it should have done in the
first place" if it wanted to continue its attempt in passing the
212
mutual fund governance requirements.
Thus, while there will always be a fear of overregulation, the
fear is particularly well-placed when speaking about the activity
of the SEC. It is therefore positive that this demonstration of
overzealous regulation on the part of the SEC was squashed by
the Goldstein court. This will allow the SEC to analyze what
went wrong and how to prevent a similar promulgating fiasco in
the future.
2.

Preventing a False Sense of Safety

In demanding hedge fund advisers to register, the SEC
risked doing more social harm than good in that certain investors
would invest without a true recognition as to the risks
involved. 213 This concern has already been touched upon in this
Note. Investors may incorrectly assume that hedge funds are
now less risky or more protected from fraud due to SEC
oversight.
These mistaken investors may potentially invest
when they are not mentally or financially prepared for what
hedge fund investing actually entails. Former U.S. Treasury
secretary John Snow, who also favors limited regulation of hedge
funds, recently expressed this concern. 214 He explained that if
the SEC assures the public that there will be "increased scrutiny"
and then they cannot deliver, it would create "a real risk of moral
hazard that implies, 'Don't worry. Now the government is
watching over you and there aren't any problems.' "215 This false
sense of security is not something that should be encouraged, but
that is what the Final Rule would have done.

another instance of the SEC going too far in its rule promulgations).
212

Id.

There are many risks that investors take when choosing to invest in hedge
funds. See Yarden, supra note 20 (listing ever-present risks that both hedge fund
managers and investors must keep in mind, including markets that are suddenly
"illiquid, complex derivatives instruments react[ing] in ways that a hedge fund
manager doesn't anticipate, pricing models... prov[ing] faulty, leverage
magnif[ying] losses and supposed market-neutral trading strategies drift[ing] with
the market. These are all factors that can have dramatic negative consequences for a
hedge fund's portfolio value").
214 See Kevin Carmichael, Bloomberg Funds Marketplace-In New Role, Snow
Urges "Lighter"RegulatoryTouch, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 1, 2006, at 18.
213

215

Id.
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The Commission majority addressed this concern of "moral
hazard." 216 The commissioners in the majority disagreed on the
grounds that using this reasoning, there should not be regulation
of any investments for fear that investors will be lulled into a
false sense of comfort. 217 Generally speaking, this is a valid
response, and that is why there is so much important regulation
in the securities markets. Regarding hedge funds specifically
though, this argument does not ring true. The Final Rule would
not have provided the protection that it intended to provide due
to its poor design and because with a lack of funding, the SEC
would not have been able to follow through with the
exceptionally greater examinations and enforcements for which it
had planned. 218 Therefore, in this unique situation, a sense of
security on the part of investors would require a much greater
leap of faith in the SEC's ability as compared to other investment
classes. That, in turn, would lead to much greater chances of loss
The
and shock for unprepared or misinformed investors.
dissenting commissioners also believed this to be a real concern,
unlike the majority. They wrote in their dissent to the Proposed
Rule, "[i]f we fail devote adequate resources [to hedge fund
monitoring] we are providing a false sense of security by
suggesting to the marketplace that, through registration, we
have bathed hedge funds in 'sunlight.' "219 Therefore, due to the
potential social harm that may have been caused through a false
sense of protection, it was crucial that the Final Rule was thrown
out.
III. SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER
This Note proposes that the hedge fund sector does not
require further regulation-what is already in place serves its
purpose well. The Treasury Department has stated that based
on research, the present system of hedge fund regulation does not
Additionally, like
show any evidence of being broken. 220
216

See Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. III.A ("Benefits").

See id.
For a complete discussion as to why the Final Rule would not have protected
investors as the SEC had hoped, see supra Part II.A.-C.
219 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,199.
Liz Moyer, Hedge Fund Heaven, FORBES.COM, July 25, 2006,
220 See
http://www.forbes.com/2006/7/25/sec-hedge-fund-regs-cx lm 0725hedge-print.html
(describing the decision as "a surprise" and relaying comments made by Randy
Quarles, undersecretary for domestic finance for the Treasury Department).
217

218
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Chairman Alan Greenspan before him, current Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke opined that enforcing the multitude of
existing laws which pertain to hedge funds is a more prudent
22 1
course of action at this point than passing new regulation.
Despite this well-reasoned sentiment, many feel changes are
necessary-even if the Final Rule was not. There are many
legally sound alternatives than that which the SEC has
attempted that could produce superior, more targeted results in
striving to meet the SEC's stated goals of better protecting
investors and the securities markets. This final part of the Note
will explore several viable alternatives that could produce these
sought-after results if it is decided that more action should be
taken.
A.

New Legislation
Those that are against further regulation stress that
although they prefer regulation as it stands now, if new law is to
222
be implemented, Congress is the appropriate body to do so.
Congress passed the original Advisers Act, and all of its later
amendments, in a conscious manner to ensure that investors in
an investment pool such as a hedge fund are not counted as
"clients" for the sake of registration. 223 The court in Goldstein
demonstrated this clearly. 224 When, as here, the intent of
Congress is unambiguous from the statute, the intended
interpretation must be used. 22 5 If at some point Congress
believes that the statute is not clear, Congress is the appropriate
conduit through which to effectuate change.
Many parties in favor of stricter regulations for hedge funds
have called for new legislation, especially since the Goldstein
decision. Right after the decision came down, a bill sponsored by

221

See Dan Caterinicchia, SEC Won't Challenge Hedge Funds Ruling, HOUSTON

CHRON., Aug. 7, 2006 (referencing Chairman Bernanke's thoughts while discussing

the SEC's decision not to appeal the Goldstein decision).
222 See, e.g., Letter from Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP to Jonathan
G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Sept. 8, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposedls73004/
wilmer09O8O4.pdf.
223 See, e.g., id. (demonstrating how the word "client" has been interpreted as
one receiving direct investment advice, beginning with the inception of the Advisers
Act).
224 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
225 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
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Congressman Barney Frank (D-Mass.) was introduced to
Congress. 226 The bill called for an amendment to the Advisers
Act that would, in effect, make the Advisers Act resemble what
the SEC had intended with the Final Rule. 227 It also stated that
this authority and interpretation does not extend to other
sections of the Advisers Act, so as not to present fiduciary
228
conflicts of interest.
This bill will most likely not become law because the second
component, informing that the new interpretation of "client" does
not extend to other sections of the Advisers Act, is precisely one
of the criticisms that Judge Randolph leveled on the Final
Rule. 229 He stated that the rule is arbitrary if it only applies to
one subsection of the statute with no justifiable reasons as to
why it should not extend to the entire statute. 230 Further, it will
be hard to explain why an adviser to a hedge fund is any
different from an attorney to a hedge fund or an accountant to a
hedge fund. All three professionals perform advisory services to
the actual business entity-the hedge fund-and it is understood
that the attorney or accountant is only serving the business
entity. They don't owe any fiduciary duty to the shareholders of
the business entity-the investors are not their clients. 231 The
same logic should thus apply to hedge fund advisers.
B. More Focused Promulgationof Rules
A far better and far less intrusive alternative would be to
merely change the definition of who qualifies as an "accredited
investor." This is the standard by which hedge funds usually
determine which individuals are allowed to invest in their
See H.R. 5712, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
See id. (stating that for the purposes of counting clients for the sake of the
exemption, the SEC has the authority to count investors, shareholders, and
beneficial owners of hedge funds as clients).
228 See id. ("The treatment of (certain individuals] as a client for the purposes of
registration under this section shall not affect, and shall not be affected by, the
treatment of such persons not as clients for purposes of section 206 or any other
section of this title.").
229 See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 881-84.
230 See id. at 881-84 (explaining that courts usually presume that the same
word in different sections of a statute have the same definition, and how the SEC
has not showed any reason as to why this rule of law should not apply here).
231 See id. at 881 (demonstrating how all three professional types would be
burdened with the same conflicts of fiduciary duties if these duties were not owed
solely to the business entity).
226
227
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funds. 232
Under the Securities Act of 1933, investment
companies which are exempt from registration can offer their
funds only to "accredited investors." 23 3 The SEC was aware of
this alternative at the time they announced the Final Rule, 234 but
they chose not to proceed with it on the grounds that it would not
satisfy all of the concerns regarding hedge funds which the SEC
had expressed. 2 35 If the SEC is intent on protecting investors,
especially "unsophisticated," inexperienced investors, 236 perhaps
it would be wiser to make one shrewd change rather than
attempting to cast too wide a net that ends up catching nothing
237
at all.
The SEC does have the authority to change requirements or
thresholds demanded in order to invest in certain vehicles. 238 In
an about-face, Chairman Cox recently confirmed that the agency
will be raising the standards necessary to be eligible to invest in
hedge funds. He said that in order to make it harder for certain
individuals to invest in the sector, the definition of an "accredited
investor" would be increased from the current level of $1 million
in net assets to a threshold of $1.5 million. 239 This Note proposes
that the current definition of "accredited investor" should be

232 See, e.g., Astarita, Registrationof Managers, supra note 167 (explaining that
normally hedge funds do not accept investors unless they are "accredited," meaning
the person earns over $200,000 annually or has a net worth of at least $1 million).
233 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text for more detailed information
regarding "accredited investors" and where the law is located.
234 See Final Rule, supra note 13, pt. II.B.9 ("Alternatives Submitted").
235 See id.
236 See, e.g., Moyer, Whither Hedge Funds?, supra note 19 (summarizing
Chairman Cox's remarks in front of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee about how
he would like it made more difficult for retail investors to gain access to hedge
funds).
237 For instance, the two-year lockup loophole is wide enough for a whale to
swim right on through. For a discussion of this loophole, see supra notes 187-91 and
accompanying text.
238 See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 211(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(a)
(2000) ("For the purposes of its rules or regulations the Commission may classify
persons and matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for
different classes of persons or matters.").
239 Jessee Westbook & Alison Vekshin, SEC's Cox Says Hedge Fund Regulation
Is 'Inadequate,' BLOOMBERG.COM, July 25, 2006, http://www. bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=a2VWRiBAROAO&refer=home. This demonstrates that
the Final Rule was unfocused and not necessary, for if the SEC truly believed that
the Final Rule was the correct course of action, they would have pushed harder for
new legislation instead of looking to raise the "accredited investor" thresholds.
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changed to allow an amount even higher than that which
Chairman Cox announced.
One million dollars is worth far less today than it was worth
when Regulation D, the rule establishing the "accredited
investor" threshold was adopted in 1982.240 The irresponsibility
in failing to increase this threshold for twenty-five years may
explain why unsophisticated investors may now be gaining
access to hedge funds-it is not that more registration is needed,
but that the SEC cannot allow a financial threshold to grow as
stale as it has. If the standard was $1 million in 1982, then
according to the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"), the threshold
24 1
should now be approximately $2 million.
This Note proposes that the threshold of who qualifies as an
"accredited investor" should be raised to at least $2 million.
Meeting a number this high appears to be reasonably necessary
to allow a person to invest in a sector with the potential to
produce enormous losses 242 in addition to huge gains. A million
dollars is just not what it used to be. Further, apart from
meeting the threshold through net assets, one can be an
"accredited investor" if one earned at least $200,000 in each of
the past two years with the reasonable expectation that such
earnings will continue. 243 Instead, the threshold to be considered
an "accredited investor" based on the previous year's earnings
should be raised from $200,000 to $430,000. This number was
chosen because, according to the CPI, in today's dollars, $430,000
is equivalent to what $200,000 was in 1982.244
Further, a time-based system should be promulgated
whereby every "x"number of years the thresholds needed to be

240 See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions
Involving Limited Offers and Sales, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982); see also 17
C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2007).
241 See Consumer Price Index Home Page, Inflation Calculator, http://www.
bls.gov/cpi [hereinafter Inflation Calculator]; see also Interview with Michael Perino,
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, in Queens, N.Y. (Nov. 9, 2006)
[hereinafter Perino Interview] (showing through statistics what are the modern day
equivalents).
242 See,
e.g.,
Jim
McWhinney,
Massive
Hedge Fund Failures,

INVESTOPEDIA.COM, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund

/05/HedgeFundFailure.asp (going over some of the biggest and most "spectacular"
recent hedge fund failures).
243 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
244 See Inflation Calculator, supra note 241; see also Perino Interview, supra
note 241.
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considered an "accredited investor" are automatically raised a
certain percentage. 245 For instance, the number can be increased
every five years to mimic the effect that inflation has had on the
value of money. This will ensure that these higher thresholds, in
place to protect unqualified investors, do not outlive their
timeliness, as, it appears, has happened with the current
"accredited investor" thresholds. Therefore, raising both of the
"accredited investor" thresholds to significant levels, and keeping
such thresholds current, would be a strong alternative to the
failed solution attempted by the SEC.
C. Education & Information
No further registration demands are necessary. One reason
for this is because the capitalist system of this country will
produce more investor protection organically. The SEC, and any
other investor advocacy groups interested, should focus instead
on educating investors about the risks and rewards of hedge
funds, instead of trying to over-regulate them 246 while perhaps
With
giving investors a false sense of the funds' safety.
awareness and education, investors themselves could then choose
which, if any, hedge fund is correct for them.
There are many ways to educate investors. One way is to
inform the investors which questions to ask when researching
the sector. The SEC's website gives some basic guidance as to
what should be asked, 247 but it could go a whole lot farther. For
instance, there are available on the internet "due diligence
guides" that present in-depth steps to take when researching a
It recommends asking detailed questions
hedge fund. 248
pertaining to, among other things, the fund's volatility, risk,

245 The efficient number of years between increases and the smartest
percentage by which to raise the thresholds should be determined by the SEC in

tandem with expert economists.
246 For a more detailed discussion of the fear of over-regulation, see supra Part
II.D.1.
247 Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge Funds and Funds of Hedge Funds,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
248 See, e.g., HedgeFund.Net's Due Diligence Guide for Investing in Hedge
Funds, http://www.hedgefund.net/ddindex.php3 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007)
(presenting an extensive guide to what investors should ask of a hedge funds in a
clear and detailed fashion).
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investment style-and which styles to be more weary of, the
249
profile of the investment adviser, fund structure, and fees.
Our capitalist system encourages individuals and entities to
release innovative products that they believe will help
consumers. This system has already produced one solution for
the hedge fund industry that will give investors more
information than ever before regarding hedge funds and the risks
associated with particular funds. The nation's largest creditrating companies are rolling out services offering detailed
information on numerous hedge funds. 250 The services intend to
provide vital information that is not yet easily available. For
example, the service that Standard & Poor's has introduced gives
investors the probability that a specific fund will default on its
loans, takes into account the fund's operational risk, and
analyzes whether the fund would be able to repay all of its
creditors if some catastrophe requires it to liquidate its
portfolio. 251 These rating services will calm one of the major
concerns of the SEC, that investors and the SEC don't know
enough about the hedge fund arena to make proper investment
decisions.
Two other practices should also be implemented by
the SEC and the hedge fund industry. First, the dissenting
commissioners suggested in the Proposed Rule that the SEC
should perform additional studies to analyze which information
should be viewed as "red flags [in order to] provide systematic
data on hedge fund trends and practices." 252 Second is a
suggestion Phillip Goldstein has proposed to several individuals
in the hedge fund industry.2 53 Indeed, hedge fund managers are
consistently sent due diligence questionnaires from investors
inquiring about the fund before they invest. 254 The information
sought includes manager biographies, compliance policies,

See id.
See Serena Ng & Shefali Anand, Hedge Funds' Next Wrinkle: Ratings, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 25, 2006, at C3 ("The ratings firms are hoping to fill an information gap
in an industry that is fast gaining popularity with a broader range of investors but
remains largely shrouded in secrecy.").
251 Id.
252 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 45,200.
253 See E-mail from Phillip Goldstein, Principal, Bulldog Investors, to author
(Nov. 2, 2006, 19:27 EST) (on file with author).
249
250

254

Id.
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2 55
To address
investment styles, "lockup periods," and more.
industry
fund
hedge
the
that
suggests
these concerns, Goldstein
information
adopt a "best practices" model to determine what
should be available for investors, and to go even farther by
including explanations of hedge fund concepts, such as leverage,
256
as well.
Implementation of these two proposals would succeed in
quelling many of the fears held by the SEC and should be
considered as a productive, free-standing alternative. If these
suggestions were combined with the hedge fund rating services
and with an emphasis on investor education by the SEC, an
efficient and expansive understanding of hedge funds and their
risks would be provided. This would be a strong alternative to
the failed solution forced by the SEC.

D. Self-Regulatory Organization
Self-regulatory organizations play a key role in this country,
and another alternative solution to the failed Final Rule would
be for the hedge fund industry to follow suit and create a bona
fide self-regulatory organization. The SEC has stated that these
organizations may actually present certain advantages over
It explains that these
direct governmental regulation. 257
industry participants
by
guidance
for
allow
organizations
whom possess specialized knowledge, and bring a unique
understanding of the industry and a heightened ability to react
swiftly to regulatory concerns. 258 Further, they lessen the time
and financial burdens that would be required of the SEC if it
alone regulated the industry. 259 Yet another benefit is that these
organizations often implement higher standards than the federal
law would require. 260 Of course, in order to have a legitimate
self-regulatory organization, "[it] must vigilantly [search for] and

255

Id.

256

Id.

257 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ

MARKET 7 (1996) (commenting on the benefits of self-regulatory organizations).
258
259

Id.

See id.

260 See id. One possible area where self-regulation may be higher is in the area

of ethics. Id.
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investigate the activities of... participants and take appropriate
26 1
action as warranted under the facts and as required by law."
As the hedge fund industry has continued to mature, its
managers have demonstrated that as a whole, they take the
integrity of their funds, their reputations, and of the entire
industry quite seriously. 262
Even without a self-regulatory
organization, they have done a fine job of "self-policing."263 Also,
hedge funds dwell in a unique corner of the broad markets due to
the investors attracted, the strategies used, and the market
benefits provided. Therefore, the industry is ripe for this type of
self-regulatory control. The SEC, with its tight budget and
rationed resources, would benefit from this as well because the
self-regulatory organization would be self-sustaining due to
membership fees, thereby allowing the SEC to divert its
resources elsewhere. 264
Additionally, the industry is large
enough to command and support a self-regulatory organization,
with assets exceeding $1.2 trillion dollars and showing no signs
of slowing down.
A good model to strive for would be that currently in place by
the National Futures Association ("NFA"). This is a nation-wide
"self-regulatory organization for the U.S. futures industry."265 It
has exceptionally high standards relating to all aspects of its
industry, including screening of new members, market
surveillance, fraud prevention, and trade practices. 266 Like the
organization this Note proposes, the NFA does not require any
taxpayer money, as it is solely supported by the dues paid by its
own members and from "assessment fees paid by the users of the
futures markets."267 Another key practice of theirs which should
be emulated by the hedge fund industry is intense investor

261

Id. at 8.

See Yarden, supra note 20 ("The hedge fund industry has, however, done a
good job of self-policing with respect to fraud. Blow-ups do occur, but the majority of
managers with established track records have consistently displayed fiduciary
responsibility toward their investor bases and assets ....
262

263

See id.

See Glassman, supra note 211 (speaking about how the SEC wasted so much
money, time, and effort on the Report and the Final Rule with nothing to show for it,
and how the resources could have been better used for other responsibilities).
265 National
Futures Association-About NFA, http://www.nfa.futures.org/
aboutnfalindexAbout.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
264

266

See id.

267

Id.
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education. 268 Based on the NFA and other successful selfregulatory organizations, this Note proposes that another
alternative solution brimming with potential would be for the
hedge fund industry to come together and take control through
the use of a self-regulatory organization.
The alternative solutions proposed by this Note are more
efficient and productive then the failed Final Rule, and all are
feasible. Regarding new legislation, the rule would at least be
constitutionally sound if promulgated in this way, even
The other
if it would still not act to protect investors.
solutions would assist in investor protection, confidence, and
understanding. They would enable hedge funds and their
advisers to continue their work in a productive manner while
doing more for investors. Finally, these solutions would allow
the SEC to gain more insight into hedge funds while still
utilizing their minimal resources in a way that can truly
maximize investor protection.
CONCLUSION
This is an exhilarating time to be an investor, with a
multitude of options available as individuals strive to reach their
financial goals. All of these options, though, make for an arduous
task on the part of the SEC. It will always face criticism and
skepticism, made even more likely due to its current lack of
resources, as it attempts to enforce and promulgate rules it feels
are necessary to protect investors and the securities markets. It
follows that the SEC should be held up to nothing but the highest
standards regarding how it accomplishes its stated goals.
Specifically because of the importance of its role, the SEC should
be expected to enforce and promulgate rules in the most focused,
fair, and well-reasoned manner.
This Note demonstrates that when it promulgated the Final
Rule, the SEC failed to live up to the understandably lofty
standards placed upon it. The Final Rule was neither fairly
conceived nor solidly structured, having been promulgated after
dismissing too quickly various dissenting opinions that were
lucid and logical. This lack of professionalism led to a rule which
See id. (informing how the organization provides investors with several tools
to assist in making financial decisions, including the many publications it provides,
and, among other things, the enormous database which includes information on all
futures firms and salespeople).
268
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would not have accomplished the goals for which it was intended
and highlighted the flaws within the SEC as currently managed.
Further, this Note demonstrates why the failure of the Final
Rule is beneficial for all involved and why the failure was
inevitable. Finally, this Note proposes many viable alternatives
to the failed Final Rule which would more efficiently deal with
the concerns of the SEC, if it is ultimately decided that more
actions should be taken. Thus, it was a positive and necessary
development for investors, advisers, hedge funds, and for the
SEC itself when the Goldstein court ruled that the Final Rule
must be vacated. Clearly, the SEC had gone too far over the
hedge.
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